J. K. Piercey v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake City and Harold Fox : Brief of Plaintiff by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
J. K. Piercey v. Civil Service Commission of Salt
Lake City and Harold Fox : Brief of Plaintiff
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Christensen; City Attorney; Homer Holmgren; A. P. Kesler; Assistants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Piercey v. Civil Service Comm., No. 7278 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1029
Case No. 7278 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
:J~ K. PIERCEY, Chief of the Fire 
~_;· Department of Salt Lake City, a 
>_ municipal corporation of the State 
>, : .. of _Utah, 
Plaintiff, _-:II~ ED 
vs. 
-) 111948 
:~ CIVIL SE-RVICE COMMISSION 
;. DF SALT LAKE CITY, and HAR-
t .- DLD_FOX, 
--- ... . -~-----. -----·---............._ ~ 
·l£ftK. SUF'm:M£ COURT, UTAlt 
. I . 
·, 
' . . 
Defendants . 
. PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF · 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. P. KESLER, 
Assistants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS-------------------------------~----- __ --------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS-------------------------------------------------------------· 7 
ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------- _.- ---- .. -----------------. 11 
I. DID THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAVE JURIS-
DICTION TO ENTERTAIN AND DETERMINE THE 
APPEAL TO IT BY DEFENDANT FOX-------------------------------- 11 
A. Civil Service Commission had no right or power 
to assume jurisdiction of the appeaL----------------------------------- 11 
B. Appeal was not taken in time____________________________________ 2 3 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW MADE BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
SHOW ON THEIR FACE THAT NO DURESS, SUCH 
AS WOULD VITIATE FOX'S RESIGNATION, WAS 
PRACTICED UPON HIM BY PLAINTIFF. ASSIGN-
MENTS OF ERROR 6, 7, AND 9------------------------------------------ 25 
A. There is no finding that Chief Piercey threat-
ened to do anything------------------------------------------------------------------ 2 5 
B. Findings contradict the conclusions ____________________________ 27 
III. THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW OR THE JUDGMENT.- ASSIGNMENTS OF 
ERROR 10 AND 11------------------------------------------------------------------ 2 8 
IV. WAS FOX'S RESIGNATION LEGALLY EFFECTIVE? 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 12, 13, AND 14------------------------ 33 
CASES 
Board of Education vs. Rose, 147 S.W. 2d 83, 132 A. L. R. 969 .. 37 
Garvin vs. Chambers, ______ Cal. ______ , 2 3 2 P. 6 9 6------------------------------ 11 
Kidd vs. State Civil Service Com., 55 P. 2nd 245-------------------------- 3 9 
Kramer vs. Board of Police Com'rs., 39 Cal. App. 396, 179 
P. 216 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 6 
People ex rei O'Connor vs. Hardy, 224 Ill. App. 198 ____________________ 38 
People ex rei Wallace vs. Diehl, 63 N.Y.S. 367, 60 N. E. 1118 .... 36 
Petersen vs. Civil Service Board (Cal. App.) 227 P. 238. ___________ 12 
Rockingham County vs. Luten Bridge Co., 35 Fed. 2d 301. ......... 34 
Roe vs. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P. 2nd 1128------------------------ 15 
Shackett vs. Town of Island, 146 Ky. 798, 143 S. W. 369, 
Ann. Cas. 1913 C. 6 0 2-------------------------------------------------------------- 2 4 
State vs. City of Brazil, ------ Ind. ______ , 73 N. E. 2d 485 ________________ 22 
State vs. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 116 N. W. 486·------------------------- 39 
State vs. Ness, 139 Ohio St. 309, 39· N. E. 2nd 849------------------------ 36 
Tooele County vs. De La Mare, 90 Utah 46, 59 P. 2d 1155 __________ 34 
Vetterli vs. Civil Service Com., 106 Utah 83, 145 P. 2d 792 ________ 13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX-( Continued) 
Page 
TEXTS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED; 1943: 
Sec. 15-9-9 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- .... ----- 3 3 
Sec. 15-9-17 ------------------------------------------------------------------------······ 3 3 
Sec. 15-9~21..------------------------------------------------13, 15, 16, 18, 2 5, 3 3 
2 McQuillin, Mun. Corps., Section 590, p. 484·------------------------------- 11 
13 2 A. L. R. 9 7 5 ---·················--·····------------------···-··---------------------------- 3 9 
43 Am. Juris. 25, Public Officers, page 980------------------------------------ 35 
4 6 c. J. 9 8 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 5' 3 8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. K. PIERCEY, Chief of the Fire 
Department of Salt Lake City, a 
municipal corporation ·of the State 
of Utah, 
Plaintiff} 
vs. 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, and HAR-
OLD FOX, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7278 
In our statement of facts, in giving the page of the 
record where matter referred to or quoted is found, we 
shall use the letter "R'', together with the page num-
ber, to indicate the page in the judgment roll, and the 
letter "T ", together with the page number, to indicate 
the page in the transcrip't of the hearing held before 
the Civil Service Commission. 
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D.efendant Harold Fox was employed as a member 
of the Fire Department of Salt Lake City, November 
23, 1943 ( T 205). On August 6, 1948, he submitted to 
pl·aintiff, J. K. Piercey, Chief of the Fire Department 
of Salt Lake Ci~ty, his written resignation from the Salt 
Lake City Fire Department as follows (R 49): "Effec-
tive this date, I hereby tender my resignation from the 
S·alt Lake City Fire Department." His resignation was 
then and there accerpted by the plaintiff (T 59). Having 
thus resigned he turned in that same day the equipment 
furnished him by Salt Lake City, which was the natural 
thing to do after he had resigned (T 24, 147). At no 
time thereafter did he report for duty (T 43). On 
August 7, 1948, he sought legal advice and, as a result, 
his attorney~ Calvin Rawlings, (T 16), prepared a letter 
addressed to plaintiff and the Board of City Commis-
sioners stating that "I (F'ox) hereby withdraw my resig-
nation from the Salt Lake City Fire Department and 
request that you disregard my letter of resignation 
dated August 6, 1948." (R 14). This letter was signed 
by Fox and mailed by his attorney's secretary and was 
received by plaintiff August 9, 1948 (T 44). 
On August 6, 1948, plaintiff ·sent to City Commis-
sioner Romney, Commissioner of the Public Safety De-
partment, a letter addressed to the Commissioner and 
the Board of City Commissioners that Fox "had submit-
ted his resignation to become effective .as of August 6, 
1948. I respectfully request that his resignation be ac-
cepted." (Commissioner's Exhibit "A", R 47). It was 
always the practice in the department, and the advice 
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of the City La\v· De-partment, that the rnan resigns to 
the Chief, and that the Chief has the right to accept 
resignations. The Chief, however, reports the resigna-
tion to the City Commission. Commissioner '·s Exhibit 
''A'' was sent to Commissioner Romney as a pait of 
this regular procedure (T 75-76) .. 
Under date of August 18, 1948, the City Recorder 
sent Fox a letter advising him that ''at a meeting of 
the Board of Commissioners held August 17, 1948, your 
petition No. 846 tendering your resignation from· the 
Salt Lake City Fire Department, effective August 6, 
1.948, was taken up and filed and I was directed to notify 
you that in view of the opinion of the City Attorney, a 
copy of which is submitted, the Board of Commissioners 
has at this time accepted this resignation." (R 4). 
On August 19, 1948, Fox filed with the Civil Service 
Commission ~a notice of appeal to the Civil Service Com-
mission reading as follows : 
''NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
''You will please take notice that I, Harold 
Fox, Fireman First Grade, in the Salt Lake City 
Fire Department, appeal to this Commission 
from the actions of Fire Chief, J. K. Piercey, of 
the Salt Lake City Fire Department, and the 
Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners in ac-
cepting my resignation from the Fire Depart-
ment of Salt Lake City after said resignation had 
been withdrawn and F'ire Chief Piercey and the 
Salt Lake City Board . of Commissioners duly 
notified of said withdrawal. 
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"It is my position in this matter that the ac-
tions of Fire Chief Piercey and the Salt Lake 
City Board of Commissioners were an attempt 
to discharge me from the Salt Lake City Fire 
De;partmen t. '' 
Attached to the notice of appeal were a copy of the Re-
corder's letter above referred to, and a copy of the letter 
of the City Attorney dated August 17, 1948, advising 
the City Commission that in view of some doubt as to 
whether the City Commission or the Chief of the Fire 
Department has the right to accept the resignation, it 
was his opinion that the City Commission should accept 
the resignation of Mr. Fox so as to make it final and 
afford Mr. Fnx whatever remedy he might have (R 3). 
We wish to emphasize that the notice of appeal is 
from the actions of Chief Piercey and the City Commis-
sion in accepting Fox's resignation after S'aid resigna-
tion was withdrawn and notice of withdrawal given. No 
claim is made in the notice of appeal, or in the letter 
withdrawing the resignation, that the resignation sub-
mitted was void or voidable by reason of any duress 
practiced in its !:P·rocurement and hence not binding upon 
Mr. Fox. The notice of appeal was not served upon the 
plaintiff. 
On August 21, 1948, after the notice of appeal had 
been filed with the Civil Service Commission, said Com-
mis·sion .served a written notice upon the City Attorney 
for Salt Lake City and upon counsel for Fox that on 
August 30, 1948, it would hear arguments from respec-
tive counsel on the question of the jurisdiction of the 
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Civil Service Commission in the matter of said appeal 
(R 5). The minutes of the Commission for August 30, 
1948, (R 32) show that the Commission heard argu-
ments of counsel upon the question of jurisdiction and 
that a memorandum of authorities was to· he submitted 
by the City Attorney. The matter was then taken under 
advisement. On September 3, 1948, the City Attorney 
filed a memorandum of authorities (R 6-12), maintain-
ing the ~position that the Civil Service Commission was 
without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 
On September 9, 1948, the Civil Service Commission 
served notice upon the City Attorney and plaintiff noti-
fying them that the C:ommission did, by resolution dated 
September 8, 1948, .assume jurisdiction of the appeal of 
Harold Fox from the removal by Chief of the Fire D-e-
partment Piercey and ordered the Chief within ten days 
after service to file with the Civil Service Commission 
and serve upon Harold Fox his complaint of removal (R 
15). A copy :of the notice ·Of appeal was attached to this 
notice. It will be noticed that the assumption of jurisdic-
tion related only to the so-called removal by the Chief 
of the Fire Department Piercey of Mr. Fox from the 
Fire Department and made no reference whatever to any 
action taken by the City Commission in accepting Fox's 
resignation. Nor is any mention made by the Civil 
Service Commission of any resignation or that it as-
sumed jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the resig-
nation submitted by Mr. Fox. 
Chief Piercey responded to said order to the effect 
that Fox had never been removed from the Fire De-
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partment except by his own resignation therefrom in 
writing, as hereinabove set out, and for that reason the 
Chief had no specifications of complaint of removal to 
make in said matter. (R 16). 
Mr. Fox answered the Chief's response, admitting 
the resignation, and for the first time asserted that such 
re·signation was a nullity as it was obtained by duress 
and threats of blasting Fox in the newspapers with un-
favor~able publicity (R 17-A). He further alleged that 
he withdrew his resignation !Prior to its acceptance by 
the Board of City Commissioners or by any other body 
or person authorized to accept it, setting out the letter 
of withdrawal hereinbefore quoted. He further asserted 
that the action of the City Commission in notifying him 
of their acceptance of the void an~d withdrawn resigna-
tion in effect was an attempted discharge, and was in-
tended as such. 
The Civil Service Commission set the matter for 
hearing November 22, 1948, at which time evidence, both 
oral and written, was taken. This testimony is contained 
in the transcript of testimony filed herein. Before any 
evidence was taken at the hearing plaintiff objected to 
the proceeding upon the ground that there is no juris-
diction in the Civil Service Commission to hear the ap-
peal. This objection wa.s stated in full. The objection 
was overruled by the Commission, (R 1-8) and plaintiff 
excepted to such ruling and thereupon the Commission 
directed Mr. Fox to proceed with his testimony. At the 
conclusion of Fox's evidence, and after he had rested, 
!Plaintiff made a motion that the appeal be dismissed 
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upon the ground that the Civil Service Cormnission had 
no jurisdiction to .entertain the appeal and that the evi-
dence did not show any overreaching as would vitiate 
the resignation tendered by Fox. This motion was de-
nied. (R 26). 
On December 20, 1948, the Commission made and 
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree 
·(R 23-28). We shall not .attempt here to make a state-
ment of the testimony taken at the hearing or of the 
findings of fact made by the Commission. Such state-
ment will be made later in connection with our argument 
on points involving the testimony and the finding_s of the 
Commission. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The plaintiff, J. K. Piercey, contends: 
1. That said Commission has assumed to exercise 
the powers of a court of equity to nullify the resignation 
of defendant Harold Fox upon the ground of duress, 
which powers are not by law or otherwise vested in said 
Commissic;n. 
2. That said Commission has assumed jurisdiction 
to adjudicate a matter that is not by law vested in said 
Commission to adjudicate, namely, whether the resig-
nation submitted by defendant, Harold Fox, as herein-
above shown, was void or voidable or effective as of 
the date it was given and accepted by plaintiff. 
• 
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3. That said Commission is by law vested with 
jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate only appeals 
made by a member of the Civil Service from an order 
of discharge issued by the head of the department; that 
there is no finding or conclusion of law by said Com-
mission that any order of discharge was ever finally 
issued or that an ~ppeal was made from an order of 
discharge, or that the defendant, Harold Fox, was dis-
charged, and without such finding or conclusion, sup-
ported by sufficient evidence, there appears upon the 
face of the proceedings a want of jurisdiction in the said 
Commission to adjudicate any issue involved in the pro-
ceedings attempted to be taken in an appeal to said 
Commission. That on the contrary the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law made by the Commission show 
that the appeal was not taken from an order of dis-
charge, nor was it based upon an order of discharge but 
that the said appeal was taken from the action of the 
plaintiff in accepting the resignation of defendant, Har-
old Fox. 
4. That in entertaining the appeal of defendant, 
H·arold Fox, and in rendering its judgment thereon, the 
Civil Service Commission has wholly disregarded and 
completely nullified its own rules and regulations duly 
adopted by it relating to the matter of discharge and 
taking an appeal therefrom and has thereby exceeded 
its jurisdiction in entertaining said appeal and in ren-
dering its judgment therein. 
5. That the said Civil Service Commission has at-
tempted to determine matters not legally before it for 
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consideration, and as to which it had no jurisdiction to 
determine, to-"it: 
(a) Whether the said Harold Fox resigned under 
duress. 
(b) V\Thether the resignation of Harold Fox was 
accepted before or after he attempted to withdraw the 
same. 
(c) "Who is the !PToper officer or body to accept the 
resignation of Harold Fox as a member ·of the Fire 
Department~ 
6. That the findings of fact of said Commission 
show on their face that there was in f.act no such over-
reaching perpetrated by Chief J. K. Piercey upon de-
fendant, Harold Fox, as could legally be held to amount 
to duress or coercion, or that could or would destroy or 
control the free volition of said Harold Fox in submit-
ting his resignation, or that would render his resigna-
tion as given involuntary and for that reason legally 
void or voidable. 
7. That the findings of fact of said Commission 
show on their face that the resignation submitted by 
Harold Fox was not involuntary and was not induced 
or procured by the exercise of coercion or duress prac-
ticed upon Harold Fox by plaintiff or any one else. 
8. That said Commission did not have jurisdiction 
to entertain and adjudicate said appeal, as the appeal 
was not taken within the time prescribed by law. 
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9. That the findings of fact of the Civil Service 
Commission do not support its conclusions of law or 
judgment. 
10. That the uncontradicted evidence does not sup-
port the findings of fact or the conclusions of law or the 
judgment made herein by the Civil Service Commission. 
11. That the Civil Service Commission arbitrarily 
or capriciously disregarded the uncontradicted evidence 
in making its findings of fact, its conclusions of law and 
its judgment herein. 
12. That the findings of fact and conclusions of the 
Civil Service Commission that the resignation of Harold 
Fox was not accepted by Chief Piercey until after the 
receipt of the letter of withdrawal is wholly unsupported 
by and is contrary to the undisputed evidence and is 
wholly capricious and arbitrary. 
13. That the conclusions of the Civil Service Com-
mission that the letter or notice withdrawing Harold 
Fox's resignation voided his resignation is wholly un-
supported by and is contrary to the undisputed evidence 
and is wholly capricious cand arbitrary, and said conclu-
sion is likewise contrary to law. 
14. That the conclusions of law and decree of the 
Civil Service Commission herein are based Ufpon wholly 
contradictory premises, to-wit, one that the resignation 
of the defendant, Harold Fox, was such a resignation 
as could be acted upon and accepted but was withdrawn 
before acceptance, and the other, that his resignation 
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was procured by duress and coercion and was therefore 
void or voidable and never binding upon him and needed 
no notice of withdra,Yal to be. repudiated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DID THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN AND DETER-
~fiNE THE APPEAL TO IT BY DEFEND·ANT FOX~ 
A 
Under this head we assert, first, that the Civil Ser-
vice Commission had no right or power to assume juris-
diction of the appeal of Mr. Fox and to render judgment 
therein that his resignation be voided and he be restored 
to his employment in the Fire Department. This phase 
is covered by assignments of error one to five, inclusive. 
The Civil Service Commission is a subordinate 
tribunal created by statute and can exercise only such 
powers as are given it by statute. "It is fundamental 
that jurisdiction must affirmatively ~ppear on the face 
of the proceedings, and that no presumption will be in-
dulged in favor of it, as is the case of a court of general 
jurisdiction.'' 2 McQuillan, M un. Corps., Section 590, 
page 484. 
In ·Garvin vs. Chambers, ------ C:al. ______ , 232 P. 696, 
the court, speaking of the Civil Service Commission, 
says: 
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''The defendant board in the instant case is 
an inferior board or tribunal of limited jurisdic-
tion exercising judicial functions. Its jurisdiction 
is limited to the determination of those questions 
which it is authorized to decide under the pro-
visions of the charter of the city of Oakland. In 
other words, it has jurisdiction to proceed only 
when facts appear in a proceeding before it which 
show that it has jurisdiction. 
''The jurisdiction of the ·civil service board, 
as previously indicated, is special and limited by 
the charter of the city of Oakland to the deter-
mination of the correctness of the order of dis-
charge of the petitioner. The power of the board 
being special and limited, no legal presumptions 
or intendments may be indulged to uphold its 
order. Petersen v. Civil Service Board ('Cal. 
Ap;p.) 227 P. 238. Facts must appear on the face 
of the record sufficient to sustain a finding that 
the petitioner was guilty as charged, otherwise 
the order of the defendant board sustaining the 
discharge was in excess of the power conferred 
upon the board, without the limits of its :special 
jurisdiction, and not in the regular pursuit of its 
authority as contemplated by sections 1068 and 
107 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.'' 
The Court further says : 
"The fact that the authority of the board had 
been invoked by the taking of the appeal would 
not deprive the petitioner of the right to attack 
the final action of the hoard of transcending its 
powers.'' 
The only provision in the statutes of this state in-
vesting the Civil Service Commission with the power to 
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exercise judicial functions is Section 15-9-21, U.C.A. 
1943. This section reads as follo,vs : 
''All persons in the classified civil service 
may be removed from office or employment by 
the head of the department for misconduct, in-
competency or failure to perform his duties or 
failure to observe properly the rules of the de-
partment, but subject to appeal by the aggrieved 
party to the civil service commission. Any per-
son discharged may within five days from the 
issuing by the head of the department of the 
order discharging him appeal therefrom to the 
civil service commission, which shall fully hear 
and determine the matter. The discharged person 
shall be entitled to appear in person and to have 
counsel and a public hearing. The finding and 
decision of the civil service commission upon 
such hearing shall be certified to the head of the 
department from whose order the appeal is taken, 
and shall he final, and shall forthwith be enforced 
and followed by him.'' 
It is apparent from the language of this section that 
the words ''removed from office or employment,'' in the 
first part of the section, are synonymous with the word 
''discharged'' used in the rest of the section. This court 
in Vette.rli vs. Civil Service Commission, 106 Utah 83, 
145 P. 2d 792, said: 
''That 'remove from office' and 'discharge' 
are synonomous expre·ssions as used in our stat-
ute, is clear from a cursory reading thereof. The 
power to 'remove from office' conferred upon 
the head of a department means not a temporary 
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but a permanent removal from office or dis-
charge." 
On the question of the limited powers of the Civil 
Service Commission, the court has this to say: 
''That for infractions of the rules of conduct 
the department head might suspend a ~lerson for 
fifteen days, as a means of effecting discipline in 
his department. That in such sphere of discipline, 
~e is in nowise subject to the sup·ervision of the 
commission. That in aggravated cases and in 
cases where the disciplinary measures given ex-
clusively to the departm·ent head prove ineffica-
cious, the power to discharge is conferred; but 
because of the severity of the penalty, as well as 
because of the fact that it involves a permanent 
severance from the department, thus aff·ecting 
the make-Ulp, of the personnel, over whose appoint-
ment the commission "is given a limited control, 
a right to appeal to the commission is granted to 
the discharged officer . or employee. The civil 
service commission is made the ultimate authority 
to determine whether the discharge should or 
should not stand. To this end the commission is 
given the authority and duty to 'fully hear and 
determine the rna tter.' That is, it is to accord a 
full hearing to the appellant and to the depart-
ment head as to the truth or falsity of the charges 
made, and thereupon to d.etermine whether to 
affirm or to set aside the order made. We do not 
find in our statute any phrase which grants the 
same jurisdiction on appeal as is conferred where 
the power on appeal is to 'affirm, modify or re-
verse, '-an expression usually if not universally 
employed where such authority is actually con-
ferred. The substitution of suspension for six 
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months without pay, in lieu of dismissal, was be-
yond the povver of the commission.'' 
In speaking of a 1police officer, "Those status under 
the statute is identical with that of a fireman, this court 
said in Roe vs. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P. 2d 1128: 
'' ""-~ police officer is responsible only to the 
head of his department, to whom has been given 
the power of appointment and removal from of-
fice. R. S. Utah 1933, 15-9-9 and 15-9-21. '' 
From the foregoing it is evident, first, that the Civil 
Service employee has a right to appeal to the Civil 
Service Commission only from an order of discharge 
issued by the head of the ~department, the plaintiff Chief 
Piercey in this case; and, second, that the Civil Service 
Commission can hear and determine only appeals from 
an order of discharge. The entire Civil Service statute 
is silent on the matter of resignation. It was not intended 
that the Civil Service Commission should have a right 
to review the reasons which might prompt an em-
ployee to resign, as his- resignation is a result of his 
own act. The right of appeal is restricted by the very 
language of the section above quoted to a review of the 
act of the Chief of the department in discharging the 
em'PJoyee, to determine whether the discharge should 
or should not stand. 
The record now before this court shows conclusively 
on its face that the Civil Service C·ommission did not 
have before it an appeal from an order of discharge, 
and further that it did not inquire into or determine the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
merits of a discharge. The notice of appeal itself states 
that ''I, Harold Fox, ... appeal to this Commission 
from the actions of Fire Chief J. K. Piercey, . . . and 
the Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners in accept-
ing my resignation from the Fire D-epartment ... after 
my resignation had been withdrawn'' and notice thereof 
duly given (R 1). We ask, where, under the language 
of Section 15-9-21, above quoted, is there any basis for 
such an appeal or any jurisdiction vested in the Civil 
Service Commission to entertain and determine such 
appeal~ 
The next step in these proceedings wa.s taken when 
the Civil Service Commission ''assumed'' jurisdiction of 
the a1ppeal pursuant to a resolution passed at one of its 
meetings, and served notice to that effect upon the 
plaintiff and ordered him to file his complaint of re-
moval (R 15), meaning, of course, under the language 
of the statute, his reasons for discharging Fox. Not 
withstanding the appeal was from the actions of the 
Chief and the City Commissioners in accepting Fox's 
resignation, the Civil Service Commission attempted to 
proceed a.s if there had been a discharge, no doubt to 
give eo lor to its ''assumed'' jurisdiction. This is evi-
denced by the fact that in the notice to the plaintiff that 
the Commission had assumed jurisdiction the Commis-
sion was careful to s·ay that it assumed jurisdiction of 
the appeal of Mr. Fox only from the removal by the 
Chief of the Fire Department Piercey and said nothing 
at all about the action of the City Commissioners in ac-
cepting Fox's resignation, although the notice of ap~eal 
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stated it 'Yas taken from that action as well as from the 
Chief's action in accepting the resignation. Apparently, 
the Civil Service Commission vva.s aware that under the 
la"~ the City Commissioners have no po,ver to re1n·ove 
a civil service employee, that povver being vested ex-
clusively in the head of the department. So it affirma-
tively appears that in entertaining the appeal and 
assuming jurisdiction the defendant Commission ex-
cluded from consideration anything the City Commis-
sioners did, relying solely upon what jplaintiff, as head 
of the department, did. 
The plaintiff filed a responS'e to the order simply 
stating that Fox had not been removed from his em-
ployment except by resigning therefrom and so plaintiff 
had no specifications of complaint of removal to make 
(R 16). Fox answered setting up that his resignation 
was ·obtained under duress and had been withdrawn 
prior to its acceptance (R 17-A). When the hearing 
was held the C·ommission did not call upon !plaintiff to 
proceed and show his reasons for removing Fox. Instead, 
the Commission declared that the burden was on Fox 
to sustain his claim of duress and withdrawal before ac-
ceptance and required him to be the first to proceed 
(T 8). 
In its findings of fact the Civil Service .Commission 
does not find that Fox was discharge~d and that the 
reasons for discharge were insufficient and hence Fox 
was entitled to reinstatement. The Commission finds 
that Fox submitted a letter of resignation but such action 
was involuntarily given "while he was frightened and 
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alarmed by and under the influence of fear, duress, and 
coercion caused and created by the statements of J. K. 
Piercey concerning the consequences to Fox and re-
sultant publicity which the sai·d· Piercey stated would 
accompany the discharge.'' ( R 2·6). 
The Commission concludes as a matter of law that 
such resignation so given was invalid 'and voidable and 
was voided by the letter withdrawing the resignation 
(R 27). In its decree the Commission declares that the 
letter of resignation dated August 6, 1948, be voided. 
Again we ask, under what language of Section 15-9-21, 
is the Commission vested with jurisdiction to so proceed 
an·d adjudicate matters- involving the adjudication of 
pure matters of law properly and inherently v-ested in 
courts of equity~ 
We are not asserting that Fox has no right to be 
heard on the question of whether his resignation was 
void or voida:ble because it was obtained under duress. 
Courts of equity are op.en to give such. hearing. What 
we do claim is that the statute does not vest jurisdiction 
in the Civil Service Commission to assume or usurp the 
powers of a court of equity and render a decision upon 
a matter not made cognizable by it under the terms of 
the statute and from which decision there would be no 
right of appeal, and thus oust the courts of jurisdiction 
to pass upon the question. It should be remembered 
that Section 15-9-21 makes the de-cision of the Civil Ser-
vice Commission final and gives no right of appeal. 
Simply because a resignation is claimed to have 
been procured under duress or misrepresentation or 
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other overreaching does not change it into a discharge. 
It still remains a resignation even though it may be a 
voidable one in a court of equity. It is adn1itted that Fox 
was not discharged. The only question before the Com-
mission, and the only question decided by it, was whether 
Fox's resignation was binding. It is obvious that the 
right to hear an appeal from a discharge, involving the 
merits of the discharge, determining whether there has 
been such conduct or neglect of duty on the part of the 
:fireman to warrant his discharge, does not include the 
~power or the right to decide whether the fireman has, 
in law and in fact, resigned his office. The latter ques-
tion does not in any way involve the fireman's conduct, 
fitness, or neglect of duty. The question of resignation 
can be determined only by applying the law to the facts. 
This- is a judicial function not vested in the Civil Service 
Commission, composed, as it may very well be, of lay-
men. In passing on the merits of a discharge the Com-
mission simply considers facts, the facts of misconduct, 
fitness-, or failure to discharge the duties of the office 
specified by the Chief as his reasons for discharging the 
employee. 
A resort to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and decree of the Civil Service Commission discloses 
there is no finding of fact or conclusion of law or other 
adjudication that any order of discharge was finally 
issued, or that the appeal was from an order of dis-
charge, or that Fox was .discharged. Without such find-
ing or adjudication, there appears upon the face of the 
proceedings a want of jurisdiction in said Commission 
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to adjudicate any issue upon said appeal except to de-
termine it did not have jurisdiction. In making the de-
cision it did the defendant Commission had to pass upon 
and decide purely legal questions, namely, what consti-
tutes duress in law sufficient to vitiate an act, when is 
a resignation accepted, when can it be withdrawn, who 
was the proper person or body to accept Fox's resigna-
tion. There may be other legal questions involved, but 
the foregoing are sufficient to show to what extent the 
defendant Commission assumed judicial powers to enter-
tain and determine the appeal to it. Certainly the stat-
ute did not contemplate investing a group of laymen with 
the right or responsibility to adjudicate such juridical 
questions. 
The Civil Service Commission, by its own rules, and 
of which the Commission said it would take judicial 
notice, (R 2-3, 188) has given a construction to its 
powers on appeal at variance with its assumption of 
jurisdiction in the instant case. Rule 4-6 provides: 
''Any employee under civil service discharged 
by the appointing power of the department where-
in emrployed may within five days from the issu-
ing by the appointing power of the order of dis-
charge appeal therefrom to the Civil Service 
Commission.'' 
Rule 4-7 provides that the order of discharge must 
be s·erved in a prescribed manner, by personal service, 
by leaving it at the usual place of residence, or by mail 
and posting on the department's bulletin board. Rule 
4-8 provides that the order of discharge ''shall have 
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issued and be complete .as to start the time running from 
which an appeal can be taken to the civil service com~ 
mission as follo,vs:'' from date of personal service of 
the order of discharge, or date it is left at the employee's 
residence or at the expiration of ten days from the date 
it is mailed and posted. Rule 4-9 prescribes that the 
order of discharge must he in writing, properly dated 
on the stationery of the department issuing the same, 
addressed to the person discharged, and must advise him 
that he is discharged from the service and state the ef-
fective date of discharge and must be signed by the ap-
pointing power of the department issuing the same. Rule 
4-11 tprovides- that a return of service of the order of 
discharge must be endorsed on the order and the same 
transmitted to the secretary of the Civil Service Com-
mission. Rule 4-12 provides that the person discharged 
may, by giving notice of appeal, appeal from the order 
of discharge to the Civil Service Commission f.or a hear-
ing within five days from its issuance. Rule 4-13 pre-
scribes that notice of appeal must be in writing and 
must be signed by the person discharged and must state 
in the body that the person appealing wppeals from the 
order of discharge of the Chief and the notice of appeal 
must have attached thereto the order of discharge or a 
copy thereof. 
Not one of these rules was complied with in the 
appeal to the Commission in the instant case. No order 
of discharge was made and consequently no service of 
an order of discharge appears in the record; the notice 
of appeal does not state that the wppeal is taken from 
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an order of discharge ; and fi~ally no copy of the order 
of discharge is attached to the notice of appeal. If these 
rules are binding and mandatory upon the person ap-
pealing,· then there is an entire failure to comply there-
with in this case. If these rules mean anything, then no 
appeal to the defendant Commission was ever legally con-
summated for there was a compliance with none of them. 
The fact that no coiD.pliance could be made because of 
the lack of a discharge only emphasizes the point that 
there was no right of appeal in the first place and no 
jurisdiction in the defendant Commission to entertain 
an appeal in the second place. 
We have made a diligent search of the authorities 
but have not been able to find any case where an appeal 
was taken from an acceptance of a resignation. We do 
not have, therefore, the benefit of legal precedent to 
assist the court in this case. However, this language 
from State vs. City of Brazil, ____ Ind. ____ , 73 N. E. 2d 
485, is pertinent: 
''When city firemen and policemen elect to 
terminate their contracts, sometimes called re-
signing, and so advise the responsible head of 
the city government, their contracts of employ-
ment are .at an end. They could not be compelled 
to work and their rights under the tenure act 
could be waived. They could voluntarily quit 
their employment at any time for any reason 
satisfactory to them. After doing so they could 
not claim any benefits under the tenure act. The 
tenure act was not passed for the benefit of those 
who quit their jobs but for those who are wrong-
fully dismissed.'' 
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B 
If the actions of Chief Piercey, in connection with 
the submission by Fox of his resignation, were the legal 
equivalent of ·.a discharge, then there was a lack of 
jurisdiction in the Civil Service Commission to act upon 
said ap·peal as the same was not taken in time. (Assign-
ment of error 8). Everything that plaintiff did was 
done on August 6, 1948. Fox's resignation was sub-
mitted that day, and by its terms was effective that day; 
the resignation was accepted by plaintiff that day and 
Fox turned in his City equipment that day and never 
thereafter reported for work, making a complete sever-
ance of his employment; and on that day plaintiff trans-
mitted the resignation to his City Commissioner. Under 
the law the power of removal is vested exclusively in 
the head of the department. The City Commission could 
do nothing to effect a removal or discharge. The fact 
that it too acted upon the resignation could not in any 
way add to or detract from the severance of employment 
already accomplished by ~laintiff in accepting the resig-
nation or by plaintiff in removing Fox from his employ-
ment if what plaintiff did was in law· a removal. The 
most that can be said of the action of the City Commis-
sion is that it was an approval of what had already 
been done. 
The severance of employment, whether deemed a 
discharge or resignation, took place August 6, 1948. 
Under hoth the statute and the Civil Service Rules above 
referred to, Fox had five days thereafter in which to 
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appeal, if what was done that day be deemed a discharge. 
He did not file his appeal until August 19, 1948, thirteen 
days later, and thereby lost his right to ap,peal. 
Later in the brief we shall cite authorities to show 
that the person _having the power to appoint is the 
proper person to accept the resignation. But to show 
that the action of the City Commission in accepting Fox's 
resignation, under the suggestion of the City Attorney, 
contained in his letter, copy of which is .attached to the 
notice of appeal (R 3), can be of no assistance to Fox, 
we refer to the case of Shackett V'S. Town of Isla;nd, 146 
Ky. 798, 143 S. W. 369, Ann. Cas. 1913 C. 602, where it 
was held that a resignation not tendered to one having 
power to appoint the resigning officer's successor is a 
nullity, the court saying: 
''In our opinion the Board of Trustees had 
no power or authority to accept the resignation 
of members of the Board, so all the acts of the 
board in accepting resignations and filling va-
cancies may be treated as a nullity.'' 
The letter of resignation submitted by Fox, defend-
ant's Exhibit "B", (T 237), was addressed to plaintiff 
alone. Immediately upon its presentation to plaintiff it 
was accepted and Mr. Fox himself turned in his City 
owned equipment, left his station and never thereafter 
presented himself for duty. Since the City Qommission, 
as such, had no power to discharge Fox, anything it did 
tending to have that effect was a nullity and a right of 
appeal from such action would not lie. The right of 
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appeal under Section 15-9-21 is only from an order of 
discharge issued by the head of the department, as the 
head of the dep~artment is the person 'vho has the right 
to discharge. Even though it should be held that what 
Mr. Piercey did was tantamount to a discharge, we sub-
mit, therefore, that the appeal was not timely made and 
the Civil Service Commission had no jurisdiction to act 
upon it except to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCL,USIONS 
OF LAW MADE BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COM-
MISSIO·N SHOW ON THEIR FACE THAT NO DUR-
ESS, SUCH AS WOULD VITIATE FOX'S RESIG-
NATION, WAS PRACTICED UPON HIM BY PLAIN-
TIFF. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 6, 7, AND 9. 
A 
It is alleged in Fox's answer, as the basis for avoid-
ing his resignation, that Chief Piercey delivered an ul-
timatum that "if you do not resign from the Fire De-
partment, I'll discharge you and blast you in every 
newspaper in Salt Lake. City. I'll give you more public-
ity than you ever had before or ever wanted." It is 
further alleged that the resignation was submitted in 
fear of the adverse effect that the threatened bad pub-
licity would have on his family and future employment 
opportunities. It is to be noted that the foregoing 
charges an avowed activity on the p.art of the Chief to 
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personally see that Fox was blasted and given unfavor-
able publicity in the newspapers. 
The findings of fact, however, do not find any such 
threatened activity on the part of the Chief or anyone 
else. All that is found is that at a -hearing before the 
Chief and the Board of Chief Officers, Fox ''was in-
formed that unless he tendered his resignation from the 
Salt Lake City Fire Department he would he discharged; 
that a discharge would be accompanied by extremely 
detrimental publicity and would seriously and detri-
mentally affect his opportunities for future employ-
ment.'' There is no finding whatever that -charges would 
be made against Fox if he refused to resign or the 
nature of any charges that might be made or that plain-
tiff would himself do anything to bring about detri-
mental publicity or do anything himself to effect Fox's 
opvortunities for future employment. The most that 
can be said of the findings is that the reference to had 
publicity and adverse employment opportunities was 
merely an opinion of the plaintiff, given as his judgment 
of what would result from a discharge. 
It is then found that the resignation was involun-
tarily given while Fox "was frightened and alarmed by 
and under the influence of fea:r;, duress, and coercion 
caused and created by the statements of J. K. Piercey 
concerning the consequences to Fox and resultant pub-
licity which the said Piercey stated would accompany a 
disharge. '' Here is an express finding contrary to the 
charge of Fox's answer that the Chief himself would 
blast him in every newspaper in Salt Lake City. In the 
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absence of any threatened action by Piercey relative to 
influencing unfavorable 1publicity, whatever publicity 
"~ould result "\Yould depend entirely upon what the news-
papers chose to print. Fox was in as good position a.s 
the Chief, or perhaps better, to guess what the news-
papers would do. Certainly he could not assume that 
they would print falsehoods or would take a position 
adverse and detrimental to his interests. There could 
be, therefore, no compulsion or duress arise out of a 
mere statement by Piercey that detrimental publicity 
would result from a discharge, a mere matter of opin-
ion only. And yet the finding of the Commission is that 
it was the statement of the Chief that unfavorable pub-
licity would accompany the discharge that rendered the 
resignation involuntary. Appare·ntly the statement that 
he would be discharged did not produce the duress for 
the Commission finds it was the statements concerning 
the bad publicity that was the duress producing element. 
We submit that that element so found is wholly insuffi-
cient to sustain the conclusion of law and decree that 
the resignation was procurred by duress and was void-
able for that reason. 
B 
The findings of the Commission themselves contra-
dict the conclusion and judgment that the resignation 
was procurred by duress. It is specifically. found that 
Fox ruppeared before the Chief and the Board of Chief 
Officers at 11 :00 A. M. and was there informed that un-
less he resigned he would be discharged and that detri-
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mental publicity would result. Then it is found that Fox 
nevertheless refused to resign. This specifically nega-
tives any idea that Fox's will was overpowered by what 
was there said. 
Then it is found that a letter of discharge was pre-
pared and at 1:30 P. M. it was delivered to Fox in plain-
tiff's office. So it appears at that time Fox was willing 
to submit to a discharge and would so submit rather 
than resign. The order of discharge had been issued and 
delivered and so far as both plaintiff and Fox were con-
cerned that ended the matter. A few minutes later Fox, 
apparently, changed his mind as the Commission found 
that he came back .and returned the letter of discharge, 
which return was accepted by ~~laintiff, and Fox signed 
the letter of resignation. We submit these findings not 
only do not sustain, but are contradictory to, the con-
clusion of the Commission that the resignation ''was 
involuntarily given while he was frightened and alarmed 
hy and under the influence of fear, duress, and coercion 
caused and created by the statements of J. K. Piercey" 
made at the meeting at 11:00 A. M. 
III. 
THE UNCONTRADI~CTED EVID·ENCE DOES 
NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS O·F FACT OR CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW OR THE JUDGMENT. ASSIGN-
MENTS OF ERROR 10 AND 11. 
Concerning what was said in the office of Chief 
Piercey at 11 :00 A. M. August 6, 1948, Fox testified 
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( T 12) as follo,vs : Chief Piercey said ''you are through 
so far as the Fire Department is concerned. I have 
asked you to resign. Why don't you resign~'' Fox re-
plied, ''I am not going to resign.'' Since the Civil Ser-
vice Commission made no finding that the Chief threat-
ened to blast Fox in every newspaper in Salt Lake City 
and make it so miserable for Fox he wouldn't get a joh, 
we assume the Commission did not believe this part of 
Fox's testimony so that part is here omitted. Piercey 
asked Chiefs White and Ward if they did not think it 
better for Fox to resign and they both said, ''Yes I do.'' 
Then the Chief said: ''I don't know what's going to 
become of you. You've got to work somewhere, but you 
aren't going to work in this Fire Department.'' Fox 
replied : ''Well, I am not going to resign. ' ' Piercey 
said: ''All right, you he back in my office at 1 :30.'' 
When he returned Chief Piercey had Assistant Chief 
Ward hand him a letter of discharge, which stated he 
was discharged for misconduct. Fox said, ''Well, is this 
all~'' Plaintiff said ''That's all.'' Fox then shook hands 
with Assistant Chiefs White and Ward saying it- had 
been nice working with them and "if that's all, I will 
go." (T 13, 14). He then had been served with the order 
of discharge. He couldn't, therefore, he frightened then 
by any threat of discharge. That it was not fear over 
the thre~at of discharge that caused him to resign is 
further evidenced by the following testimony: He was 
asked what he was worried about. He answered: "I 
figured if he (Chief Piercey) carried out his threats why 
it would be just like he said-it would be difficult for 
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me to find work. I figured the only thing to do was to 
resign.'' After making up his mind to resign he re-
turned and asked Chief Piercey if it was too late to re-
sign. Piercey said he did not know but he would try his 
best. The letter of resignation was prepared by the sec-
retary and was signed by Fox. Fox was asked again 
what was the impelling consideration that caused him 
to sign the resignation. He replied : ' 'Well, knowing 
Chief Piercey was an influential high official I knew he 
would he very instrumental in my obtaining employment 
anywhere else. I was quite scared and quite worried, 
and I signed it because I did not want him to carry out 
his threats, for fear of my family going to go without." 
When asked what threiats, he answered: ''When he said 
he would make it so miserable, smear me and make it so 
miserable it would be impossible for me to find a job.'' 
(T 15). 
We repeat the Commission in its findings of fact 
did not find that Chief Piercey threatened to smear Fox 
so he couldn't get a job. The Commission simply found 
that at the hearing before Chief Piercey and the Board 
of Chief Officers, Fox was informed ''that a discharge 
would be accompanied by extremely detrimental public-
ity :and would seriously and detrimentally affect his ~p­
portunities for future employment.'' There is a total 
absence in such finding of any threat by Chief Piercey 
that he, the Chief, would see to it personally that Fox 
was smeared so he couldn't get a job and according to 
Fox himself it was only what Chief Piercey personally 
threatened to do that caused Fox worry. 
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Since the Commission studiQusly refrained from 
making any finding that the Chief threatened to smear 
Fox, it must have not believed that 1part of Fox's testi-
mony as it was in ·direct conflict with the testimony of 
Chief Piercey and the four assistant chiefs who com-
posed the Board of Chief Officers. 
Chief Piercey, when asked whether he made the 
threats testified to by Fox, answered: ''That is abso-
lutely untrue. That was never said, he would be blaste·d 
in the newspaper. It was never said it would he so 
iniserable he couldn't get :work.'' ( T 37). 
Assistant Chief Thompson was asked if anything 
was said about blasting Fox in the newspaper, and he 
answered: ''Never once was there any mention of a 
newspaper other than that in the event of a discharge 
Harold mentioned he would fight the discharge, and in 
event of a discharge in a Civil Service trial, all the in-
formation that came out of the trial would be public 
property and be detrimental to his character. That is 
the only thing that was mentioned. Nothing mentioned 
about newsprup·ers at all. There was nothing said about 
making it tough for him. It was mentioned that the 
Chief and Chief Officers did not want to make it dis-
agreeable for him to find other employment, and if he 
elected to resign when anybody called up for references, 
so far as the department records are concerned, he had 
resigned from the Fire D·epartment. '' ( T 85, 86). 
Assistant Chief Smith was asked: "Was there any-
thing said by the Chief if he (Fox) did not resign he 
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(Piercey) would blast him in the newspapers~" he 
answered: ''Absolutely no.'' Q. ''Was there anything 
said about making it miserable for him if he stayed on~'' 
A. "No, sir." 
Assistant Chief White testified as follows: Q. "Was 
there anything said by the Chief about blasting him in 
the newspapers~'' A. ''No, absolutely not.'' Q. ''Was 
there anything said by the Chief about making it miser-
able for him if he did stay around~'' A. ''It was just 
the opposite. '' ( T 132). 
Assistant Chief Ward's testimony was as follows: 
Q. ''Did you hear Chief Piercey say anything about 
blasting Mr. Fox in the newspapers~" A. "No, I did 
not.'' Q. ''Did you hear Chief Piercey say anything 
about making it miserable for him if he did not resign~" 
A. '' Nu, I did not.'' 
Instead of there being any threat of blasting in 
newspapers and smearing Fox so he could not get a job, 
all that was said by Chief Piercey was to point out that, 
if Fox were discharged and he resisted such action, a 
hearing would he held at which the Chief would have to 
prove the charges against him by calling in witnesses, 
and that that procedure would result in publicity; also, 
if inquiry vvere made by prospective employers of Fox, 
the facts concerning his discharge might have to be ex-
plained and that would be unfavorable. (T 30, 35, 37, 
39). This testimony is corroborated by Assistant Chiefs 
Thompson (T 85, 86), Smith (T 114), White (T 132), 
and Ward (T 158, 159). According to Fox's own testi-
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mony, already referred to, it 'vas not the threat of dis-
charge and its attendant consequences relative to ipub-
licity or future employment that impelled him to resign, 
it was the personal malignant interest which Fox claims 
Chief Piercey threatened he would take to see that Fox 
was blasted in the ne"'spapers and his chances for future 
employment impaired that impelled Fox to resign. But 
the Commission did not find the existence of such im-
pelling facts. There is no evidence, therefore, to sustain 
the finding that Fox's resignation was given involun-
tarily while under the influence of duress and coercion. 
IV 
WAS FOX'S RESIGNATIO·N LE·GALLY EFFEC-
TIVE~ ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 12, 13, and 14. 
The first question is, who was the proper person to 
accept the resignation~ Under our statutes, Section 15-
9-9 U.C.A. 1943, the Chief of the Fire Department is the 
only person vested with the right to appoint and to fill 
vacancies. Under Section 15-9-17 the Civil Service Com-
mission shall certify the name of those eligible for ap-
pointment to "the appointing power." No one will con-
tend that the "appointing power", to whom such certifi-
cation is made, is anyone other than the Chief of the 
Fire Department, Mr. Piercey in this case. Section 15-
9-21 provides for removal from office by the "head of 
the department" who, it must be conceded, is the same 
person, the appointing power. 
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In Tooele ~County vs .. De La Mare,, 90 Utah 46, 59 P. 
2nd 1155, the rule is stated as follows: 
''The law is well settled, in the absence of 
statutory provisions to the contrary, that when 
the authority to fill a vacancy is, by law, vested 
in a particular commission or officer, such com-
mission or officer is the proper authority 'to a~c2pt 
the resignation from such officer.'' 
As stated in Rockingham County vs. Luten Bridge 
Company, 35 Fed. 2nd 301: 
"It is well established law that, in the .ab-
sence. of express statutory enactment, the auth-
ority to accept the resignation of a public officer 
rests with the power to appoint a successor to 
fill the vacancy. The right to accept a resignation 
is said to be incidental to the power of appoint-· 
ment. 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp. 3d Ed., Sec. 413. 
''The mere filing of the resignation with clerk 
of the superior court did not of itself vacate the 
office of Pruitt. It was necessary that his resig-
nation he accepted. But, after its acceptance, he 
had no power to withdraw it.'' 
Fox submitted his resignation to Chief Piercey, the 
prop·er officer to accept it. We have already shown that 
the Chief accepted the resignation the day it was given 
and that Fox severed.his employment that day. We have 
already shown, also, thatthe City Commission could not, 
by its action, assume jurisdiction which it otherwise did 
not have to act upon or accept the resignation. It had 
no power to a;ppoint or to fill vacancies. 
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It is elementary that ~'after acceptance of a resig-
nation effective immediately, one has no power to with-
draw it.'' 43 Am. J ur. 25, Public Officers, Section 170. 
The rule is stated in 46 C. J. page 980, Section 135 
as follows: ''An unconditional resignation which has 
been made to the authority entitled to receive it cannot 
be withdrawn.'' Since Fox's resignation was accepted by 
the Chief and complete on August 6, 1948, he could not 
withdraw it thereafter, as he attempted to do in his 
letter of August 7, 1948, which was not received hy the 
Chief until August 9, 1948. 
The next question is whether Fox's resignation was. 
voidable because of duress. The duress found by the 
Commission is that Fox was informed that unless he 
tendered his resignation from the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department he would be discharged; that a discharge 
would be accompanied by extremely detrimental publicity 
and would ser_iously and detrimentally effect his oppor-
tunities for future employment; that the letter of resig-
nation was involuntarily given by Fox while he was 
frightened and alarmed by and under the influence of 
fear, duress, and coercion caused and created by the 
statements of J. K. Piercey concerning the consequences 
to Fox and resultant rpublicity which the said Piercey 
stated would accompany a discharge. 
We submit that this finding does not sustain the 
conclusion of duress. That a resignation could be . sug-
gested and advised as an alternative to preferring 
charges, where there was no threat and the officer was. 
not obliged to sign the resignation, and that a resignation 
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under such conditions would be upheld was decided in the 
case of Reople ex rel Wallace: vs. Diehl, 63 N.Y. S. 367, 
affirmed in 60 N. E. 1118. In Stat·e vs. Ness, 139 Ohio St. 
309, 39 N. E. 2nd 849, the rule of the Civil Service Com-
mission provided that '' accept~ance by an appointing 
officer of the resignation of a person discharged before 
final action by the Civil Service Commission will be con-
sidered a withdrawal of the charges and the ·separation 
of the employee thus resigning shall be entered as a 
resignation and the proceedings shall be dismissed with-
out judgment.'' It was held in that case that a resigna-
tion submitted by a police officer while charges were 
pending against him was not null and void -qnder this 
rule. This clearly shows that resigning as an alternative 
to standing trial upon charges for dismissal does not 
necessarily imply or involve duress. Certainly it is not 
to be supposed that the Civil Service Commission would 
make a rule permitting something to be done which would 
involve duress as a matter of law. 
Kramer vs. Boar.(]) of Police Commissioners, 39 Cal. 
App. 396, 179 P. 21'6. In this case plaintiff, a member of 
the police department, was given a three months' leave 
of absence to go into business as a means of cutting down 
the cost of the police department being assured that the 
leave could be extended for one year. He purchased a 
stock of merchandise and engaged in business. Within 
three months he was ordered to return to duty. U1pon his 
requesting additional time he was informed that he must 
either report for duty or resign. He protested this order 
but presented his resignation which was accepted. He 
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brought a suit for reinstatement claiming- that his resig-
nation was not Yoluntary but was induced by duress and 
coercion. The court holds that the resignation was not 
induced by duress or coercion but was voluntary saying: 
''In order for the action of the board of police 
commissioners in presenting to the plaintiff the 
alternative of either resigning from or returning 
to his post of duty in the police department to 
have savored of duress or coercion, such action 
must have been unlawful under the long accepted 
definitions of these terms. 
"In the case of State v. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 
116 N. W. 486, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058, which in-
volved a resignation from office, it was held that 
ihe coercion or duress which would render such 
resignation either void or voidable must be such 
as would exist where one by the unlawful conduct 
of another was induced to resign his office under 
circumstances which dep.rived him of his free will. 
"Measured by these definitions it must be con-
cluded that the plaintiff's resignation from the 
police department was not induced by either 
duress or coercion, but that the same was volun-
tary, and hence, upon its acceptance by the board 
of police commissioners, worked a final severance 
of the relation of the plaintiff as a police officer 
with the police department of the city and county 
of San Francisco.'' 
Board of Education vs. Rose, 147 S.W. 2nd 83, 132 
A.L.R. 969. Here the pla1ntiff resigned as a county super-
intendent of schools pursuant to a comp-romise agreement 
between two factions of the board of education whereby 
litigation over the right of a member of the board to 
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hold office was discontinued and charges filed againot 
plaintiff were to be dropped and he was to resign. Plain-
tiff claimed his resignation was obtained under duress 
under the law stated in 46 ·C. J. 980, as follows: 
"A resignation signed as an alternative to 
having charges made against the signer cannot 
be said to be given by the party resigning of his 
own free will, and can be repudiated at any time.'' 
The court first points out that this text is based 
entirely upon the case of PeO'lJ!le ex rel O'Connor vs. 
Hardy, 224 Ill. App. 198, "in which a conditional resigna-
tion was obtained from a Civil Service employee by 
threat of a superior officer to file charges :against him 
and the resignation was accepted three years after it was 
tendered under circumstances which did not justify a dis-
charge of the employee.'' The court held that the facts 
of the case before it did not bring it within the rule from 
Corpus Juris saying: 
''No member of the county board made any 
threat of any kind with reference to filing charges 
against the appellee or any statement that appel-
lee would he removed as .a result of the hearing 
on the charges. '' 
It seems that plaintiff was fearful of an adverse 
deeision on the charges filed against him and thought 
the decision thereon would be against him. The court 
points out he could have appealed from an adverse deci-
sion, but he chose rather to resign. "No such duress was 
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imposed Uipon him such as entitled him to withdraw his 
resignation which had been accepted.'' 
In 132 A.L.R. 975 is a note on the subject of duress 
as ground for withdra,ving or avoiding resignation from 
public office. Some of the cases above cited are there 
cited. The other cases referred to in the note involved 
factors of duress which are not present in the instant 
case. The case of People ex rel O'Connor vs. Rardy, 224 
lll. App. 198, referred to in the case of Board of Educa-
tion vs. Rose, supra, is referred to in said note. That 
case, however, is distinguishable from the instant case as 
is pointed out by the court in the case of Board of Edu-
oation vs. Rose. 
In the case of State vs. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 116 
N. W. 486, the evidence showed that the officer was 
threatened with personal violence and with the filing of 
charges of embezzlement against him and that his farm 
would be taken from him to cover his shortage unless he 
resigned. 
In the case of Kidd vs. St~ate Civil Service Commis-
sion, 55 P. 2nd 245, the resignation was obtained under 
false representations and vromises as to reinstatement, 
the court saying that it appears "that appellant's signa-
ture to the resignation was obtained by false representa-
tions in that he signed the same to protect his civil serv-
ice standing believing the doctor's statements to be true.'' 
The other cases cited in the note do not disclose the 
facts out of which the duress arose. 
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We respectfully submit that the Civil Service Com-
mission was without jurisdiction to entertain and hear 
the appeal of Mr. Fox. We further submit that the 
findings of fact and c~nclusions of law show on their 
face that there was not such duress or coercion asserted 
upon Mr. Fox as would .avoid his resignation. We further 
assert that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain such a 
conclusion. We maintain, therefore, that the judgment of 
the Civil Service Commission ordering the restoration 
of Mr. Fox to his employment with the Salt Lake City 
Fire Department should be set aside and vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. P. KESLER, 
Assistants 
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